Policing is in some ways in a perma-state of crisis over funding, yet the future is looking particularly bleak, given the increasing competitive pressures on the UK’s public service financing. As witnessed after 2010, when funding cuts dramatically changed policing (reducing neighbourhood and roads policing capacity and capabilities), even more pressures on precarious services are now anticipated.
Although in tough times it can be a natural tendency to bunker down and try to squeeze out any remaining capacity using traditional means, there comes a point where getting more with less starts to become unfeasible and something more radical is needed (Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk, 2013).
Agility and ingenuity
Cooper (2021) recounts some lessons learned from innovative agility during COVID-19, for example, but Rankin (2009) shows how there have been repeated examples of how ingenuity has been accelerated by the onset of crisis, over many years. Indeed, Seville (2016) argues that by taking a different view of crises, rather than simply managing ameliorations, latent paradigm shifts can be catalysed.
That is not so much about ‘putting a brave face on’ but rather being pragmatism of confronting the need for change through a proactive lens (Kovoor‐Misra, 2009). Doing the same when that is not enough, or is not possible, is a sure fire indicator of the need for agility. Carter and Varney (2018) describe such a proactive outlook as Social Darwinism, following the old maxim that it is the most agile that survive and thrive.
A change of outlook
Policing may feel that it has exhausted all its options and that there are no answers, given the financial crisis, but scholars who have explored the opportunity of crisis have some interesting points that may be relevant. Room (2016) and Perkin (2023) both report how creative, alternative mindsets can ref-frame not only contexts but deliverable performance: but such transformational agility requires the ability to think differently, beyond traditional linear sequential logic.
For example, reverse engineering (Otto and Wood, 1996) represents something of a ‘back to the drawing board’ mindset when regrouping around purpose can trigger fresh insights for ways forward. McNary (1997) summarises the notions of strategy before structure, as advocated by W. Edwards Deming. This remains relevant as the crises that occur often concern structures, not strategy. This is then compounded by a preoccupation with structural deficiencies that overshadow a strategic focus.
The policing mission
If we take policing, although there is a need for refreshing its purpose, the last Royal Commission (1964) reinforced the core purpose of policing as the prevention and detection of crime and there has been no subsequent Royal Commission (as yet) to countermand that. Keeping communities safe from crime, and detecting criminal acts when they do occur is the articulated goal: hence within reverse engineering we can start here and work back.
What structure can keep communities safe from crime in a preventative fashion? What structure can best enable detection? Are the structural answers to these questions (focused on the strategic goal) the same ones in play now? Maybe the current structures cannot remain in any case because of financial pressures but were they the best ones anyway? Does the crisis create an opportunity to think again, because we have to?
Ignoring the data
Research shows us that prevention (as opposed to reacting to symptoms) is achieved holistically, not in silos (Rennie, 2025). In the case of crime, there is much to be learned from heath-based approaches, namely that policing as a single strand activity does not prevent crime that much (Gilmour, 2025). It follows that worrying about policing structures is something of a distraction in the pursuance of prevention, since research indicates an increase in police numbers would not be the single best investment to achieve crime prevention.
If preventing crime is not about police structure then what is it about? There is some complexity to answering that but Professor Stan Gilmour argues it tends to be achieved where there is pro social investment to achieve local agency. Ironically, given the preoccupation of problem-solving in policing (Goldstein, !979) we know more abut what the and where the problems are rather than what preventative solutions might look like. That doesn’t mean data isn’t available, it’s just that most of us have chosen not to look.
How well do we understand cold spots?bf
A cold spot is the complete opposite of a ‘hot spot’ (Sherman, 1989). The College of Policing has amassed an entire library abut hot spotting (trying to respond to problems) but has collated nothing about those contexts where crime is so low that there isn’t a problem in the first place. Think about that.
If the first pillar of the policing mission is prevention why has conventional thinking restricted us understanding more about what good looks like and simply complied a huge list of problems, which are unaffordably expensive to reactively resource? Reacting to a symptom (problem solving hot spotting) is not prevention but rather treatment; and treatment as a structural approach is enormously resource-intensive and expensive.
Investing in prevention
This is not just the job of the Police and the Police in many ways have a negligible role to play. Everyone wants to be safe and The Crime and Disorder Act (1998), particularly in Section 17, provides a framework for holistic working, accountable to the public. The United Nations, in its articulation of Sustainable Development Goal 16 has also prioritised this outcome as a vital public good for citizens, wherever they live.
It’s not that we don’t know about the concept of prevention, it’s just that we are not doing it as well as we might. A first step to move forward would be to better understand what good looks like, and replicate it, in order to evolve from the reactive cycle of firefighting.
Detection
The second part of the policing mission is the detection of crime. Investigation for detection is currently hampered by the lack of time available to do it because the police are too busy doing other things (Prince, Lum and Koper, 2021). Cunneen (2023) charts how much police investigative capacity is diluted by trying to do too much of too many things, leaving clear up rates woefully poor. Whilst there is some collation of how best investigative structures and processes give the best return (Coupe, Ariel & Mueller-Johnson, 2016) a significant reason investigation fails is because there isn’t enough consistent quality investment because of competing demands.
Crime detection means amassing the demanding burden of proof for disposals and court hearings but forensic gaps, lack of witnesses and actionable intelligence are persistent challenges. It is unsurprising that Jung and Wheeler (2023) have explored how technology and surveillance affect clear up rates as investment and acceptance (by the whole of society) in guardianship surveillance potentially offers a way of better enabling investigative capabilities, particularly in our digital age.
Guardianship surveillance
Again, the Police can only put the known evidence before the court and they can only collect evidence that is there. A stronger societal commitment to routine guardianship surveillance would enable investigation structures (whether human or AI) to function much more smoothly. The police job of investigation is severely hampered by lack of societal agreement to enable the existence of evidential capture in the first place: that is not a choice of the Police but of wider society.
If there is a police force out there now worrying about the crippling affects of yet more budget cuts consider this. Firstly, have you identified, understood, and sought to enable transfer opportunities of low crime areas, by working with the public and partners? Most forces invest their time in problem solving, so the answer is probably ‘no’. Secondly, within your force area, initiate a conversation with partners and the public about how guardianship surveillance (for example via technology) could transform the evidential trail, if they were to agree to its use. Some of the countries with the lowest crime rates and highest detection rates have smart surveillance capabilities (Tutak & Brodny, 2023); and it isn’t always about the highest police numbers.
Focus on outcomes
In either element of the policing mission, structures are not the key point – outcomes are – and there is more than one way to achieve any goal. In reality the police can’t do it alone so the answer is to re-think structures by focusing on the end game and not just on traditional (and outmoded) traditions that have increasingly been failing, funded or not. The opportunity here is to change, thanks to the crisis.
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